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People Learning To Help Themselves
by
Carl Tjerandsen
Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation (dissolved)1
When the preparation of a final report of the Emil
Schwarzhaupt Foundation was first envisaged, it was assumed that
it would deal primarily with education for citizenship and, hence,
would be primarily of interest to civic educators. However, be-
cause so much of its grant program involved efforts to form com-
munity organizations or to use other kinds of groups (e.g. 4-H
club groups or boys clubs) as vehicles within which certain be-
haviors might be changed, it became evident that other kinds of
professionals such as social workers or community health educators
might find the experiences of its grantees to be useful.
A review of materials dealing with these stories suggests that
successes or failures were affected by choices made with respect
to certain elements of the organizing effort such as whether to
1The Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation began its work upon the death of
its founder in 1950. Its goal was "to promote...the upbuilding
and betterment of American citizenship .... " Because this charge
was so broad, the Trustees decided to narrow its focus to the en-
couragement of participation of citizens in efforts to deal with
problems of common public concern, especially but not exclusively,
in a community context. During a period of about twenty-five
years, a total of something under four million dollars was expen-
ded. The work of its grantees is reported in its final report
entitled "Education for Citizenship: A Foundation's Experience."
Inquiries concerning the report may be addressed to the Emil
Schwarzhaupt Foundation, 425 Miramar Drive, Santa Cruz, CA 95060.
recruit individuals or organizations or whether conciliation or
confrontation should be the preferred tactic.
Those projects deemed successful are those in which there was
evidence of the achievement of goals and objectives; where the
organization had an impact; and where participants changed so as
to become more effective as citizens or as problem solvers. An-
other criterion was whether or not activities initiated in one
place had sufficient vitality to be replicated elsewhere.
This paper examines some of the factors which affected grantee
results -- with one further caveat. The elements are discussed
separately but several may have been involved in a given success
or a failure.
1. Initiating activity: Who decides?
The question is sometimes raised concerning the right of out-
siders to come into a community proposing to change it.
Alinsky maintained that the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF)
did not try to organize a community except by invitation. With
respect to those grant projects for which the IAF was responsible,
invitations were forthcoming. In the Community Service Organiza-
tion (CSO) program, the starting point was the house meeting, con-
vened at the request of the staff person. In the Woodlawn Or-
ganization (TWO) in Chicago, staff met with organizations to ex-
plain and request support. While all elements in these communi-
ties did not join in the invitation, a group representative of a
legitimate "cluster of interests" was involved. The time spent
articulating problems and goals and how an organization might help
certainly contributed to the success of the IAF projects.
Although the Highlander grant had perhaps the greatest impact
of any the foundation supported, not all of its activity was suc-
cessful. To test a concept Miles Horton, the Director, did not
believe in, he sent a small staff, without any preliminary con-
tact, into two communities to start a "community leadership train-
ing program." The effort failed miserably.
Having decided, however, to emphasize community leadership,
Horton was alert in residential workshops offered at Highlander
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for expressions of interest he might follow up. For example, when
Septima Clark asked how 68 children on Johns Island could have
died of diphtheria and nothing was done and when Esau Jenkins
asked if Highlander could help him to get his neighbors on the
Island registered to vote, Horton said he would go to the Island
to explore what could be done. It took perhaps a year of talking
but the effort produced the Citizenship School which was repli-
cated and had an enormous impact across the South. The basis for
cooperation was sound.
On the other hand, a grant to the National Conference of
Catholic Charities was made for an organizing project in St. Louis
which, because of local difficulties, was suddenly shifted to
Lackawanna, New York. An organizer was sent in before the local
sponsor could even begin to understand what was happening. Given
the lack of preparation, together with the conflicting interests
and the cynical political climate, failure was inevitable.
2. Compatibility of purpose and practice
The projects sponsored by the Industrial Areas Foundation were
among the most successful that the Foundation supported. Communi-
ty Service Organization chapters were formed in 35 communities or
counties in California. Because of the interest in voter reg-
istration, citizenship classes were a major program. In each lo-
cal chapter, a Citizenship Committee organized the classes, re-
cruited teachers, arranged for materials, and provided a committee
member to serve as an aide for each class. At the peak, 108 clas-
ses were meeting, averaging about 25 students in each. This was
only one of several major on-going programs over the length and
breadth of Central and Southern California. Yet this activity was
supported by only two staff persons -- Fred Ross and Cesar Chavez.
The work was being done by the members. The purpose of helping
people learn to help themselves was consistent with the methods
employed. People learned to do things by doing them, with the
guidance of staff who understood their role to be that of teacher
and not merely that of provider of services.
Other grantees failed because staff did not involve people in
the right way. For example, on the Pine Ridge reservation, AFSC
staff sent to do community organization work appointed Indians to
a committee to advise the staff instead of the other way around.
In Boston, neighborhood house staff expressed regret that it was
necessary to use lay persons to help form block organizations be-
cause staff could not do it all. In Chicago, a project was spon-
sored by the Welfare Council to provide staff to strengthen
citizen organizations. The staff criticized one group for choos-
ing as its goal the improvement of physical facilities rather than
the expansion of welfare services. The staff was trying to impose
its priorities on the community group. The project failed and
unexpended funds were returned.
Several factors may have been involved in the failure of these
projects, but certainly the failure to place responsibility on the
people who were supposed to be the focus of the enterprise was a
principal one.
3. Who should be included in the organizing effort?
Many would say that not to invite everyone to join an or-
ganization being formed would be wrong, even immoral. This is
sometimes referred to as the "whole community" approach. Others
would try to limit membership to those who share a "cluster of
compatible interests" which are seen to be consistent with program
goals.
The United Community Fund Project in San Francisco became an
extreme version of the former. The stated purpose in the applica-
tion was to help citizens learn to solve problems. The staff per-
son hired, however, imposed his own goal, which was to develop a
"sense of community." At an early meeting, he congratulated those
present for being there as individuals and not as representatives
of "interests." The organization for him was anyone who came.
When the organization's housing committee in Haight-Ashbury
(encouraged by the young editor of a neighborhood newspaper) an-
nounced after several weeks study that it would recommend at the
next meeting that the city designate the area for urban renewal,
that meeting was packed by landlord interests who feared higher
taxes. Given the lack of any membership structure, nothing could
be done by the committee to impose any control of the process.
The group died in a sea of acrimony.
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By contrast, the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, a
membership organization in Chicago, set as its goal, establishing
"an inter-racial community of high standards." It concluded that
this goal could be served only if it sought to enlist those who
would support it. Therefore, membership among realtor groups was
not encouraged. In its most active period, it was highly success-
ful. It then had over 2500 dues-paying members, but as many as
7,000 volunteers were working at one time or another on one or
more aspects of its program. It succeeded, in part, because its
membership reflected a cluster of compatible interests.
The Community Dynamics Program at Earlham College espoused a
"whole community" approach, partly on moral grounds. Its project
in a Kentucky mountain community worked there because there were
problems on which the community could readily unite, including
flood control, cooperation in repairing their churches, and work-
ing for more equitable allocation of road funds. But, in Indi-
anapolis, racial tension prevented cooperation except at a very
nominal level. It was possible to do a survey but not form a
block club. "Success" was possible only by drastically limiting
goals.
The CSO movement represented a different version of the prin-
ciple. The initial cluster-of-compatible-interests was built on
the concerns of less-advantaged Mexican-Americans, such as dis-
crimination with respect to naturalization, police protection,
employment, voter registration, and social welfare. With this
program, CSO's enrolled thousands of members. Their political
power grew and middle class-oriented Mexican-Americans began to
join.
Being more articulate, they tended to win election to office
in the CSO. But if a social worker, lawyer, or teacher became
president, pressure would no longer be applied, for example, to
gain a hearing for a member having difficulty with a governmental
agency. In one San Joaquin community, a proposal to create an
industrial area through urban renewal would have wiped out much of
the barrio. The CSO chairman, who was a school teacher, said the
CSO must remain neutral and stated at the city council hearing
that the CSO took no position on the proposal. But the people of
the barrio made so persuasive a statement that the proposal was
defeated. The credibility of the CSO having been destroyed,
however, by the pusillanimous behavior of the chairman, the mem-
bership fell away, leaving only the chairman and a few of his
friends. A field trip to a dozen CSO's showed those headed by
professionals or semi-professionals were dead; those headed by
artisans or farm workers were alive.
The middle-class members were not only ashamed of the disad-
vantaged members, they opposed raising dues to provide staff to
help them with the services they needed, for example, with
naturalization procedures. Unable to maintain a compatible
"cluster of interests," the CSO's withered and Cesar Chavez re-
signed to form the United Farm Workers Union. As he said, the
"success of CSO tends to destroy it."
4. What should be the basis of membership?
The question of the basis of membership was usually seen as a
choice between individual or group membership. In most cases, the
choice appeared to reflect local circumstance rather than
principle.
However, to Alinsky, who referred to his work as mass or-
ganization, it was a matter of principle. For him, the purpose of
organization was to gain power for the members. And this was most
quickly done by recruiting existing organizations which would have
more ready channels into the community as well as more financial
power. One possible weakness, of course, might be that organiza-
tion members would include too many individuals opposed to the
overall goals.
Among the Foundation's grantees, the organization basis worked
especially effectively in the Woodlawn Organization. To illus-
trate, an individual requesting help (e.g., with a problem in an
apartment building), might be asked, as a condition of receiving
help, to organize the building residents into a group which would
then become an organization member of TWO. Program and organiza-
tion developed reciprocally.
It is ironic, therefore, that the CSO's should have been or-
ganized on the basis of individual memberships. But in the bar-
rios of the 1950s and 196 0s in California, there were virtually no
significant Mexican-American organizations to be organized. Al-
though individual membership was the only practicable alternative,
the weakness was that the structure lacked the strength to support
a staff (although in retrospect Fred Ross thought this difficulty
could have been surmounted).
Organizing by groups did not ensure success, however. In
Butte, Montana and in Chelsea in New York City, large associations
were formed on the basis of organization members. But, in each
case, the interests and goals of these organizations were so di-
vergent that both projects failed. The "cluster of interests"
could not hold.
In sum, the membership basis chosen made a significant dif-
ference in given situations.
5. Reaching those to be helped.
Not all grantees were sufficiently successful in involving on
a timely basis the people with whom they were ostensibly to work.
The Migrant Ministry requested a grant to try to form organiza-
tions among migrant workers in Texas, Illinois, and Michigan,
recognizing that its traditional approach of providing services
through local committees of clergy, church members, social work-
ers, and growers was not adequate. The Migrant Ministry said it
hoped to use IAF methods to bring migrants to a level where they
could hold their own with the Establishment.
A survey in a fruit-growing area in Michigan showed that about
a thousand black workers came each season but that about a hundred
black migrant families had settled on a more or less permanent
basis.
After much time spent on the survey and discussions with local
agency personnel, the local Council and project staff, as the
first organizing step, appointed several black "leaders." When
nothing further happened, they discovered that these "leaders" had
a following consisting of a small group of descendants of Civil
War-era blacks plus gardeners, household help, etc., who feared
contact with migrants would be too controversial. No recent mi-
grants had been included.
The staff finally found a person among the recent migrants who
saw that people who had similar problems should work together. In
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a three-week period, 22 house meetings were held. Finally, there
was progress, but by then, the project funds were virtually gone.
The point is that several months had gone by in making a sur-
vey and researching services before any serious effort was made to
reach the migrants for whom the project was set up in the first
place.
6. Cooperation versus Confrontation
Perhaps the liveliest issue on the list is whether conflict or
cooperation will characterize the relationship of the organization
and its milieu. For one group, the answer involves goodwill and
rational discussion to resolve differences. Others are convinced
such a course will often be ineffectual, especially if there are
differences in status among the interests involved.
Alinsky, for example, did not believe that those who enjoy
privileges or discriminate against others would change their prac-
tices unless pressure was brought to bear. The organization's
goal, then, must be to gain sufficient strength to enable it to
negotiate effectively.
Instances of discrimination were easy to find. For example,
in California, naturalization examiners efused, contrary to law,
to give examinations in Spanish or asked much more difficult ques-
tions of Mexican-Americansthan were asked of Anglos. Black
schools in Woodlawn were grossly overcrowded while classrooms in
white schools stood empty.
Appeal to moral principle was necessary but not sufficient as
was the appeal to statute or regulation. In the end, it was
the boycott against certain Woodlawn merchants that cured the
cheating problem. It was the sight of 45 busloads of Woodlawn
residents arriving at City Hall to register that helped to get
Mayor Daley's support on the redevelopment issue. It was the
Citizenship Schools on Johns Island that produced enough black
voter registration to swing the election to one of the white can-
didates for the position of judge, who was then willing to be
fair. The highly successful English and citizenship classes and
voter registration drives in Mexican-American communities began to
turn their situation around.
But confrontation was not the only acceptable approach. The
Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference worked adjacent to the
University of Chicago. The leadership of the Conference believed
that there was a sufficient constituency supportive of cooperation
and negotiation, of seeking facts and marshalling sound arguments,
and of taking steps to promote an interracial community of high
standards, that success was possible. The Conference did not
limit itself to dialogue, however. It worked out effective ar-
rangements for ensuring code compliance by combining the efforts
of its volunteers working with the staff of the building depart-
ment. It worked hard to inform its constituency with respect to
its goals and evidence of progress. But it was not hesitant about
pressing the city government to enforce the laws. In Hyde Park-
Kenwood, cooperation as a tactic had significant impact.
It should be noted that although Woodlawn and Hyde Park were
adjacent, they were quite different. The residents of Woodlawn
were largely black, poorer and less well-educated (hence, of lower
status) than the residents of Hyde Park. For Woodlawn, confronta-
tion was more acceptable, especially as it was directed largely
against outsiders. The interests needing to be influenced in Hyde
Park were largely resident there and, in any case, found coopera-
tion more commensurate with their educational level and lifestyle.
In connection with the confrontation-cooperation issue, the
project conducted by the South East Chicago Center (SECC) and its
director, Everett S. Cope, is also germane. The SECC was located
by the great South Works of U.S. Steel in South Deering. Resi-
dents were mostly Yugoslavs or Italians. Several years before the
project began, public housing, called Trumbull Park Homes, was
built. Instead of preference for local residents, people from
elsewhere in Chicago, including welfare clients, mostly single
parents, were moved in. South Deering felt betrayed. About the
time the project began, it became known that blacks were also to
move in. The community exploded, literally and figuratively, as
cherry bomb detonations became a nightly occurrence. At one, 300
police were detailed to Trumbull Park Homes each 24 hours, the
largest police detail in the history of the city to the time.
Cope's rationale emphasized several points: 1) Proper conduct
by tenants would earn respect in the surrounding community; 2)
Concrete activities would help bind hostility and develop a sense
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of belongingness; 3) The program would have to be based on ac-
tions; not talk about it. Merely to talk about how to work
together interracially would leave the focus on differences; 4)
The agency had to be clear and firm about its policies; board of
staff must be integrated; 5) The Center must serve all, including
offenders; 6) The attention of the community must focus from the
first on a common need reflecting a warm, human impulse (in this
case, pre-school children); 7) Something constructive must be done
at once; 8) There must be continuous citizen participation in
planning, conducting and supporting the program; and 9) The work
should begin with basic existing groups without trying to force
integration.
He proposed to begin with a half-day nursery school program
emphasizing the participation, training, and counselling of
parents, to be followed by a club program for small, natural
groups of school children and teenagers. At the same time, work
would begin with adult clubs, looking forward to the development
of relationships on a community organization level.
After five years, there were 50 nursery schoolers with half
from outside the project. There were 20 clubs for children with
200 members of which 25 were from South Deering and 35 were black.
Teenagers had become assistant leaders. There were 350 adults in
the club program of whom 15 percent were from outside. Trumbull
Center had achieved its own independent, interracial board. The
South Deering Improvement Association, a center of opposition to
the SECC, asked cooperation in promoting a senior citizens program
through the Center, to include project residents. Given the na-
ture and virulence of attitudes prevailing in South Deering at the
time, these achievements were remarkable.
Was this project an example of confrontation or cooperation?
Perhaps neither. Cope would not cooperate by giving in to South
Deering. On the other hand, he did not throw down the gauntlet of
battle. He finessed the opposition by choosing ground the latter
could not readily violate. He compelled the enemy, in time, to
cooperate instead.
7. Role of Staff
A review of our projects shows that project staff help was
usually considered essential, especially where situations were
complex and/or conflict was involved.
The primary staff role in successful projects was that of
educator so that members could learn to do for themselves. A
needed staff contribution was to keep alert to opportunities to
combine solving a problem and building the organization.
In general, those projects seemed to flourish (in the absence
of other strong negative elements) in which staff did not see
themselves as doing things for people but stressed the importance
of the people taking responsibility for their own problems, who
used on-going activities as opportunities for leader training, who
were alert to questions to tactics and strategy and who could ad-
vise organization leaders of opportunities as well as dangers.
Devolving responsibility on members as much as possible was not
how project staff functioned in Pine Ridge, the Welfare Council of
Metropolitan Chicago, or Upper Roxbury in Boston. These projects
failed.
8. Financing the Organization
Alinsky argued that a community organizzation should become
self-supporting in three years. The number of organizations re-
aching this goal was very small. Community Service Organizations
were not successful in this regard. But this was so, in part,
because when more members from the middle class joined, they voted
against dues to finance the services needed by the poor members.
Fred Ross believes, however, that the financial problem might have
been solved, had a reasonable dues structure been adopted early
enough and been combined with a Service Center Program.
TWO did achieve an adequate financial base through organiza-
tion member dues and earnings from a community newspaper. As for
neighborhood house grantees, raising funds from members did not
seem to concern them. They expected gifts and grants to produce
what was needed. Dues and fees were set only to the extent needed
to impose some feeling of responsibility on the part of users of
services.
One fund-raising technique which led to controversy might be
mentioned. A popular device among a few grantees was the raffle.
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Catholic members usually saw little objection; Protestant members
were opposed, seeing it as merely a redistribution of resources
through gambling. In some cases, this became a sharp issue.
In general, self-financing was a difficult problem, usually
not productive enough to support necessary staff.
9. Sponsorship
The kinds of sponsorship fell into several categories. The
most significant consisted of free-standing organizations, each
being an extension more or less of one individual's world-view.
This group included Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, Hor-
ton's Highlander Folk School, and McNickle's American Indian
Development. A second group consisted of national organizations
which included a community focus as only one element in a total
range of programs. Examples are the American Friends Service Com-
mittee, the Migrant Ministry, and the National Conference of
Catholic Charities. A third group included metropolitan groups
such as the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago. A fourth
category included neighborhood houses. Colleges were included in
a fifth category. And a sixth category consisted of a single
grantee -- the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference which was a
neighborhood organization made up of individual dues-paying mem-
bers and block clubs.
Reviewing grantee results overall, it is clear that the most
successful group was the first. The IAF, Highlander, and American
Indian Development shared the following characteristics. Each had
a founder with a mission to help deprived persons learn to help
themselves. Each found like-minded people to share the task.
Each was realistic about what needed to be done and had the
courage to persevere. Concentration of effort and understanding
of what needed to be done went hand in hand.
Briefly stated, it seems clear that unless grantees understood
what needed to be done, had a realistic view of community
dynamics, were committed to helping people learn to help them-
selves, and had the courage to persevere, success was unlikely,
regardless of the kind of sponsorship.
10. Education and Evaluation
For Horton, the educational focus must be central. His start-
ing point was a residential workshop in which 25 or so par-
ticipants were encouraged to discuss the problems of their home
communities, each contributing something to the understanding of
each other's problems. Beyond this, Horton sought to help each
person gain a deeper understanding of his or her potential, to
become able to think of oneself not just as one was, but as one
might become, not only of the situation as it is but as it ought
to be.
The key to the success of the American Indian Center in Chica-
go lay in its emphasis on the members taking responsibility for
what went on in the Center, the Center which provided the frame-
work within which new, more constructive roles could be tried out.
This was a central educational value. The more knowledgeable and
successful members provided leadership for the less fortunate. As
each took more responsibility, he gained identity.
The CSO program also had an educational focus. Fred Ross
spent countless hours with chairmen of committees and with of-
ficers helping them to think through a task or problem. His tech-
nique was to ask questions. What will you do if too many things
are suggested to be done? (Set priorities.) How will you get the
people of the neighborhood to pitch in to help get sidewalks?
(You don't send around a petition. You hold house meetings. That
gets you more members, too.) After a meeting, Ross would go over
the discussion, helping the leaders to understand what had hap-
pened and how they might do better next time. In this framework,
the emphasis was directly focused on training leadership for the
purpose of making the organization more effective, to increase its
power.
For Horton, the emphasis was on broadening and deepening
understanding on the part of the individual. It was his or her
growth that was primary. The value to the organization would
follow.
Alinsky added an overtly educational program to the CSO or-
ganizing effort in which officers, committeemen, and members would
meet perhaps once a month to discuss some topic of concern to the
membership. In several CSOs, these had a major impact. In these
sessions, it became clear to the participants what the basic is-
sues really were. As one CSO leader put it: "Your organization
is your gun and you learn in the educational program where to aim
it and when to shoot. Another thing you learn which you never
thought about is what the shooting is all about."
In general, the strongest programs were those which recognized
that action and learning must go together.
Summiary
This paper has attempted to identify in the experiences of
Schwarzhaupt Foundation grantees elements which, if invoked or
ignored, would be likely to lead toward success or toward failure.
These elements involve questions of: initiating activity in the
community; compatibility of purpose and practice; inclusion or
exclusion of community interests; the preferred basis of member-
ship; reaching, in fact, those to be helped; cooperation or con-
frontation as tactics; role of staff; method of financing; spon-
sorship; and the role of education and evaluation. Some elements
seem to be more decisive in their impact than others, but, in
general, the choices made by grantees of these elements did make a
difference. An important theme which pervaded each of these proj-
ects was that social development and individual development must
go hand in hand.
The Foundation's goal was not to promote community organiza-
tion for its own sake. Rather, it was to promote the "upbuilding
and betterment of American citizenship." As it turned out, en-
couraging people to learn how to help themselves and each other,
proved to be a powerful experience for developing the ways of
thinking, feeling, and acting which are essential elements of ef-
fective citizenship. As just one example, I think of the old
field worker in Stockton whom I asked what the CSO had meant to
him. He said, "Senor, we have learned not to be afraid." Courage
is not the least of the civic virtues nor of the virtures of the
organizer.
